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Abstract 
 
In this study, we argue that an approach which will reconcile the two opposing camps in Sino-
African relations and bring the most progress is a “middle passage” that greases 
contradictions and offers an accommodative, balanced and  pragmatic vision on which 
Africans can unite. We present a case under which countries can substantially enhance the 
prospect of development if an African consensus builds on a merger between the Western and 
Chinese models. We balance national interest with human rights, sovereign authority with 
individual rights and economic goals with political rights. The chapter presents arguments on 
the need for a development paradigm in Africa that reconciles the Washington Consensus 
with the Beijing Model. The analytical framework is organised in three main strands, notably: 
(i) historical perspectives and contemporary views; (ii) reconciliation of dominant schools of 
thought and paradigms surrounding Sino-African relations and (iii) practical and 
contemporary implications.  Reconciled schools of thought are engaged in four main 
categories: optimists versus (vs.) pessimists; preferences in rights (human vs. national, 
idiosyncratic vs. sovereign and political vs. economic) and the Beijing model vs. the 
Washington Consensus.  
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1. Introduction 
This chapter is presented as an argument to address two types of readership: policy makers 
who can easily grasp the arguments without the cumbersome exercise of references and 
scholars in the academic community without prior knowledge of underlying concepts who 
may need substantive references.  
Three main schools of thought dominate Sino-African relations: the Pessimistic, 
Optimistic and Accommodation schools. Pessimists view the nexus as asymmetric in favour 
of China. Optimists contend that China is offering Africa an opportunity of charting its own 
development course without Western policy prescriptions. The third school is founded on the 
premise that the relationship is an ineluctable process that can be mutually beneficial if 
African countries adopt a common ‘China strategy’ based on rational economic arguments in 
order to balance the asymmetric relationship (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). Pessimists are 
advocates of the Washington Consensus (WC) for the most part, optimists are sympathetic to 
the Beijing Model (BM), whereas proponents of the Accommodation school view Sino-
African relations in the light of a paradigm shift or/and the contemporary African Consensus 
that incorporates both the BM and the WC (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013).  
 The WC can be defined as ‘liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in 
political rights’, while the BM is most understood as ‘deemphasised democracy, state 
capitalism and priority in economic rights’. (Asongu, 2016a). The current African consensus 
or New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) champions (i) the promotion of 
strong institutions, good governance, democracy and human rights and (ii) ‘African 
sovereignty’. The first is consistent with the BM whereas the second is in accordance with the 
WC for the most part. Whereas the WC promotes human rights and democracy that are 
advocated by the NEPAD, the non-interference policy of the BM is also in accordance with 
the NEPAD’s core value of African ownership. The NEPAD therefore incorporates both the 
WC and the BM. Furthermore, the NEPAD reconciles both the first and second schools siding 
respectively with the WC and BM.  
 In this chapter, we articulate the highlighted reconciliation into more perspectives, 
notably: optimists vs pessimists, preferences in rights (national vs human, sovereign vs 
idiosyncratic) and economic vs political rights. The Accommodation school posits that the 
Optimistic or Balance-development school can build on the criticisms levelled by the 
Pessimistic or Neo-colonial school to improve on development issues surrounding the Sino-
African nexus. According to the narrative, China is simply playing by globalisation standards 
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that are cherished by the Pessimistic school. Globalisation is now an unavoidable process 
whose challenges cannot be neglected without jeopardising the prosperity of nation states. 
Hence, given the growing relevance of China in an increasingly globalised world, Sino-
African relations can be viewed as a historic process that is steadily evolving towards a 
mutually beneficial development if the right policies are put in place.  
 Concerns about preferences in rights motivating the Pessimistic and Optimistic 
schools merit emphasis. The WC vs BM, or first school vs second school, are respectively 
consistent with the following analogies: human vs national rights; idiosyncratic vs sovereign 
rights and political vs economic rights. First, on the debate over human vs. national rights, 
China’s non-interference policy is based on the preference of national over human rights. 
There is a long standing suspicion by African countries of Western bias when it comes to the 
conception and definition of human rights. Recently, gay rights have become a fundamental 
human right and are considered to stand before national rights (legislative, judiciary and 
executive). An example is the humiliating suspension of loans and grants to Uganda because a 
bill voted by the legislative power is signed into law by the executive authority. Furthermore, 
the West has been overtly hypocritical in the criticisms she has been levelling on Sino-African 
relations, especially with regard to China’s policy of non-interference.  Two facts merit 
emphasis here. Historically, France’s policy towards Africa has not been greased by her 
cherished values of ‘liberty, fraternity and equality’. China’s ‘resource diplomacy’ in Africa is 
consistent with the USA’s oil diplomacy in Saudi Arabia.  
 Second, idiosyncratic or specific-individual rights are  as important as sovereign 
rights. Hence, one should not take precedence over the other according to Chinese foreign 
policy. African countries are waking-up to the realisation that foreign policy should be 
friendly and void of hegemony. More so, international law should not be skewed towards 
enabling some sovereign nations to criticise and punish other sovereign nations on issues that 
are legitimate and sanctioned by domestic principles of democracy and law. The underlying 
suspicion  extends to the selective application of law by the International Criminal Court.  
 Third, with regard to priorities between ‘the right to vote’ and ‘the right to food’ 
advocated by the WC and BM respectively, it is no longer a moderate consensus that political 
rights are more endogenous than  economic rights. It is very likely that a person with an 
empty stomach will sell his/her ‘right to vote’ in exchange for daily bread. The BM has 
delivered a burgeoning middle class within a breathtaking spell of time. Once this middle 
class has been established, liberal democracy will  be credible and sustainable because  it  is 
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very likely to prefer the ‘right to vote’ independently of the ‘right to food’. It follows that the 
WC is a long-term development strategy. This is not susprising because it took some Western 
champions of liberal democracy more than 150 years to provide equal rights to their citizens. 
In the sections that follow, we substantiate the points highlighted above in greater detail.  
 The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 engages historical and 
contemporary perspectives while the dominant schools of thought are presented and 
reconciled in Section 3. Section 4 discusses their practical and contemporary relevance 
whereas Section 5 concludes with a summary of the arguments.  
 
2. Historical and contemporary perspectives 
  
This section is discussed in five main strands: a brief summary of the literature on 
possible causes of Africa’s underdevelopment; foremost development models; contemporary 
development proposals; recent trends in African poverty in the light of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) poverty targets and the most recent perspectives on solutions to 
the continent’s underdevelopment.  
Consistent with Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015), Africa’s development tragedy can 
be discussed in fifteen main streams, namely: (1) loss of traditional institutions (Lewis, 1955; 
Amavilah, 2006, 2014) and/or African deinstitutionalization (Nunn, 2008, 2009; Nunn & 
Puga, 2012); (2) the neglect of  art as an expression of technological know-how (Amavilah, 
2014); (3) juxtaposition between ‘private property rights’ and ‘private use rights’ (Amavilah, 
2015); (4) idleness of natural resources  (Doftman, 1939; Lewis, 1955; Amavilah, 2014); (5) 
overvaluation of foreign knowledge and devaluation of local knowledge (Asongu et al., 2014; 
Amavilah et al., 2014; Tchamyou, 2015; Lwoga et al., 2010; Raseroka, 2008; Brush & 
Stabinsky, 1996); (6) the inability to acknowledge scarcity (Dorfman, 1939; Lucas, 1993; 
Drine, 2013; Fosu, 2013; America, 2013; Asongu, 2014ab; Looney, 2013); (7) excessive 
consumption of luxurious goods by the rich elite a (Efobi et al., 2013; Adewole & 
Osabuohien, 2007); (8)  the false economics of pre-conditions (Monga, 2014) and the lost 
decades with the Washington Consensus  (Lin, 2015); (9) issues surrounding colonialism, 
neo-colonialism and Western imperialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013); (10) over reliance on 
Western policies (Fofack, 2014) and development assistance (Asongu, 2014c; Obeng-Odoom, 
2013; Moyo, 2009); (11) failure to integrate qualitative development measurements in 
development paradigms (Obeng-Odoom, 2013) and the ‘Africa rising’ narrative (Obeng-
Odoom, 2015); (12) the need for  a paradigm shift from strong economics (or structural 
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adjustment policies) to soft economics (or human capability) development (Kuada, 2015); 
(13) low-depth of regional integration (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, et al., 2014); (14) fragile 
institutions, absence of conducive local conditions and ineffective negotiation of the terms of 
foreign aid (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001) and less stringent property rights essential for reverse 
engineering and imitation of foreign technology (Asongu, 2014d) and (15) corruption in 
international trade (Musila & Sigué, 2010).  
 The argument for a reconciliation between the WC and the BM deviates from 
mainstream literature on African development models. These consist of, among others: the 
Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development (LPA, 1980-2000); Africa’s Priority for 
Economic Recovery (APPER, 1986-1990); the African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programmes for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP, 
1989);  the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990); the 2001 
NEPAD (OAU, 1980, 2001; Bujra, 2004; Adedeji, 2002); self-reliance as a sustainable path to 
African development (Fofack, 2014, p. 13) and development strategies from developing 
countries based on a lessons from both the WC and BM (Fosu, 2013).  
 A strand of post-WC development models also close to the argument entails  the 
New Structural Economics (NSE) and Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP). The NSE posits, 
without necessarily tailoring a unified economic theory, that, some convergence between 
ideologies of structuralism and liberalism are needed. The approach which recognises both 
state and market failures (see Fofack, 2014, p. 14) is advanced by inter alia: Chang (2002); 
Lin and Monga (2011); Norman and Stiglitz (2012); Stiglitz et al. (2013ab) and Stiglitz and 
Lin (2013). The second or LIP school is oriented towards, among others, institutions for 
effective delivery of public services; institutional conditions for successful growth and 
institutional diversity (see North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Brett, 2009). 
 An April 2015 World Bank report on MDGs has shown that extreme poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) notwithstanding more than two decades of resurgence in 
growth that began in the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2015a, p. 44). This is despite narratives of:  Africa 
rising (Leautier, 2012); Africa being on time for the MDG poverty target (Pinkivskiy & Sala-
i-Martin, 2014) and an African growth miracle (Young, 2012). Obeng-Odoom (2013, 2015) 
has documented that such narratives may be more concerned with extolling the neoliberal 
ideology and capital accumulation than fundamental ethical concerns like inequality, 
ecological crisis and sustainable jobs.  
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 A more recent stream of the literature has been devoted to proposing measures towards 
understanding and solving Africa’s poverty tragedy. The concern about exclusive growth on 
the continent has motivated a recent book by Kuada (2015) which proposes a new paradigm 
of ‘soft economics’ as a mechanism by which to understand Africa’s development trends. 
Fosu (2015bc) has responded with a book devoted to: elucidating myths behind Africa’s 
recent growth resurgence and the role of institutions in  it. According to Kuada (2015), it is 
important to deviate from strong economics (neoliberal economics and structural adjustment 
debates) and focus on soft economics (or human capability development) in order to 
understand, inter alia: immiserizing growth, increasing poverty and low employment levels. 
The paradigm shift of Kuada (2015) is broadly in accordance with a recent stream of African 
development literature which is tailored towards reinventing foreign aid for inclusive and 
sustainable development (Simpasa et al., 2015; Page & Shimeles, 2015; Jones et al., 2015; 
Asongu, 2015a; Jones & Tarp, 2015; Page & Söderbom, 2015;Asongu & Jellal, 2016; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016b). 
 In the light of the above, reconciling the domination schools on Sino-African relations 
for an African development model is important for two reasons. On the one hand in the post-
independence era, Africa and China were in the same economic muddy waters. Whereas 
China opted to chart its  own development course, most African countries took to 
prescriptions of the WC. On the other hand, contemporary differences in development are self 
evident because China has progressed at a  spectacular pace and is now providing 
development aid to Africa.  
 
3. Reconciling dominant schools of thought  
 
 There are three main schools of thought in the Sino-African literature, namely: 
optimists, pessimists and   accommodators (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Asongu, 2016a). The 
first group (or Optimistic school) are China optimists who argue that cooperation with China 
provides Africa with the opportunity of charting its own development course without much 
Western interference and policy prescriptions. This group is sympathetic to the “Beijing 
model” of governance, which focuses on state control and national sovereignty. The second 
group (or Pessimistic school) consists of China pessimists who are wary of the fact that the 
Sino-African relationship is skewed in favour of China. This category instead prefers the 
democracy-oriented approach of the West which articulates the WC belief that champions 
political rights underpinned by free market competition. The third group (or Accommodation 
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school) consists of ‘China accommodators’ who combine both the pessimists’ wariness and 
optimists’ goals. They argue for  the need for a common development strategy towards China 
that minimizes asymmetries in the relationship as much as possible. The values promoted by 
this group are consistent with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) which 
emphasizes both African sovereignty/ownership and the process of liberal democracy as a 
solid foundation for development.  
 We reconcile the three groups in four principal categories: pessimists versus (vs) 
optimists; right preferences (human vs national, idiosyncratic vs sovereign and political vs 
economic); the Beijing Model vs the Washington Consensus and an African development 
model that integrates both the WC and the BM (Asongu, 2016a).  
 First, from a recent survey of the literature (see Asongu, 2016a; Asongu & Ssozi, 
2016), authors are most sympathetic to the Accommodation school because there are strong 
reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic about Sino-African relations. On the one hand, 
in the light of Tull (2006) and Asongu et al. (2014), the West has been hypocritical when 
criticizing the foreign policy of China in Sino-African relations. This is essentially based on 
the fact that the foreign policy of the United States of America towards Saudi Arabia is not 
sanctioned by the USA’s ideals of liberal democracy and human rights. Accordingly, like 
China, the USA’s foreign policy is guided by the same terms of resource/oil diplomacy. 
Moreover, notable developed countries or former colonial powers are no exceptions to the 
yard stick of ‘resource diplomacy’. The moral compass of French foreign policy towards her 
colonies were not historically guided by her much cherished ideals of ‘liberty, fraternity and 
equality’. On the other hand, the Sino-African nexus, like most historical processes, is bound 
to evolve steadily and sustainably because China is growingly asserting her footprint in an 
increasingly globalised world.  Accordingly, globalisation has come to stay: it has become an 
inescapable phenomenon process whose challenges cannot be overlooked without 
jeopardising the prosperity of nation states (Tchamyou, 2015). In the light of these facts, the 
Accommodation school argues that the Optimistic school can leverage on criticisms from the 
Pessimistic school in order balance the asymmetry in contemporary Sino-African relations. 
The reconciliatory arguments are consolidated by the fact that China is playing by the same 
globalisation standards that are so much cherished by the Pessimistic school.  
 Second, fundamental concerns about rights’ preference which animate the first and 
second schools require some clarification, namely: human vs national (see  Taylor, 2006);  
idiosyncratic vs sovereign rights (Asongu et al., 2014) and political vs economic rights 
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(Lalountas et al., 2011; Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014c, 2015). It is important to note that the 
second-set of rights (national, sovereign and economic) are consistent with the Optimistic 
school whereas the first-set (human, idiosyncratic and political) are in accordance the 
Pessimistic school.  
Three points merit critical emphasis here.  
(1) The foreign policy of China that articulates non-interference is partially based on 
the need to give priority to national rights over human rights. Africa has been very suspicious 
of bias from Western nations when it comes to the manner in which human rights are 
conceived and defined. As a case in point, gay rights which are being increasingly 
acknowledged as a fundamental human right in preference to national rights (executive, 
legislative and judiciary)
1
. It follows that African countries that are passing and enforcing 
anti-gay laws are doing so at the price of hurting the Washington Consensus and limiting their 
eligibility for some categories of development assistance. For instance, very recently the 
World Bank and some Western donors have suspended foreign aid to Uganda because of an 
anti-gay legislation bill that was signed into law by the president of the republic (Asongu, 
2015b).  
 (2) Consistent with Taylor (2006), China’s foreign policy is guided by the principle 
that sovereign rights should not be preceded by specific individual or idiosyncratic rights. 
Hence, given that African countries are constantly decrying neo-colonial and hegemonic 
influences in their domestic policies, it is reasonable for China to articulate her position that 
under international law, sovereign nations should not be critical of other sovereign nations on 
domestic issues that are sanctioned by principles of democracy and law. If the Pessimistic 
school were to acknowledge this point, she would be joining the Accommodation school 
which is more in tune with constructive criticisms.  
(3) Distinguishing between the ‘the right to food’ and ‘the right to vote’ has been the 
subject of intense debate in recent Sino-African development literature (see Moyo, 2013; 
Asongu & Ssozi, 2016; Asongu, 2016). There is also an evolving stream of literature 
documenting that economic rights (economic prosperity and productive structures) are more 
exogenous to political rights (see Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014). In this light, the Pessimistic 
school could acknowledge that developing nations are more in need of economic rights than  
                                                          
1
 It is also relevant to note that the selective application of law by the International Criminal Court is also an 
eloquent example of African suspicion towards Western bias on the human rights concept. 
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political rights.  Most of their criticisms on the Sino-African relationship would be set out in 
more constructive terms, hence joining the ranks of the Accommodation school.  
Third, on the debate over whether economic rights should precede political rights, 
there is some consensus in the literature that the Beijing model should be prioritised as a 
short- term development model whereas the Washington consensus should be the long term 
development goal (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2016a; Asongu & Ssozi, 2016). This is essentially 
based on the (i) reality that the BM has delivered a burgeoning middle class to China within a 
spectacularly short spell of time and (ii) the hypothesis that the WC is a more sustainable and  
inclusive model.  Hence, the Accommodation School also posits that both the Pessimistic and 
Optimistic schools make cases for priorities in the long term and short run respectively.  
In the light of the above, the two schools of thought are reconciled in the perspective 
that a sustainable middle class is necessary  before political rights can be genuinely demanded 
because in average terms, a sustainable middle class would be less likely to trade its vote for 
basic needs like food and shelter. The relevance of income levels in the demand for political 
rights has been established in both developing (Lalountas et al., 2011) and African (Asongu, 
2014e) countries.  
Fourth, a reconciliation of the two schools of thought is consistent with the rules 
guiding the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Hence, both the WC and 
the BM are accounted for in the NEPAD essentially because the NEPAD recognises both 
African ownership/sovereignty and the need for democratic processes in sustainable 
development. Hence, priorities of the WC (or democratic and human rights) and BM (or 
sovereign and economic rights) are both incorporated in the NEPAD and Accommodation 
School. The NEPAD, which is the current African consensus, has been espoused by African 
nations that are serious about advancing the continent. It is worthwhile noting that the 
NEPAD is a consensus for the development of Africa that articulates a number of principles 
on its charter that are sympathetic to both BM and WC, namely: good governance, human 
rights, democracy, sustainable development, non-interference and sovereignty.  
 
 
4. Practical and contemporary implications 
 
The 2011 Arab Spring experiment is an eloquent testimony of the need for multi-polar 
development strategies on the African continent that incorporate both the BM and WC. In 
Egypt, the overthrow of  President Morsi was qualified by the United States Secretary of State 
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John Kerry as not a coup d’état, but a restoration of democracy. A few days later, Senator 
John McCain qualified it as a coup d’état that overthrew a legitimate government. A few 
months later, we were  informed by Abdel Fattah that it might take 25 years for Egypt to 
experience Western-style liberal democracy. In Tunisia, the current president is a product of 
the regime that was overthrown in 2011. There is growing consensus that post-Gaddafi Libya 
is a failed state, with many rebel factions and conflicting governments attempting without 
success to dictate the law of the land.   
The fact that we are referring to the Arab Spring example means that sovereign rights 
are as important as individual rights. Hence, consensus-building for political breakthroughs is 
better than resorting to military strength in conflict resolution. For instance, the Western 
slogan of ‘Assad must go’ before any negotiation has consolidated the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Levant (ISIL). Today, at least three facts are difficult to refute: (i) Libya is substantially 
worse-off than it was before 2011 because her citizens still do not have the politico-economic 
rights they demanded; (ii) the citizens of Iraq are also worse-off than they were, prior to US 
invasion in 2003 and (iii) the ‘Assad must go first’ policy has strengthened ISIL. This 
narrative should not be construed as condoning the policies of Bashar al-Assad, Saddam 
Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. What we seek to show is that, had the West reconciled her 
priority for political rights with ideals of the Beijing model, Libya, Syria and Iraq may not be 
the failed states today.  
Growing South-South relations and challenges to Bretton Wood institutions with new 
establishments (e.g. the New Development Bank, Contingency Reserve Arrangements and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) are due to increasing dissatisfaction by developing 
countries with the WC (Desai & Vreeland 2014; Asongu, 2016b). Accordingly, the 
architecture of power on which on which Bretton Woods institutions were founded is no 
longer legitimate: from geo-demographic and politico-economic perspectives (see Cooper and 
Farooq 2015; Dixon 2015). With more than 45 percent of African countries failing to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goal extreme poverty target, there is a growing realisation that 
it would require a paradigm shift in the post-2015 development agenda. A new model that 
reconciles, inter alia: (i) human rights with national rights; (ii) idiosyncratic rights with 
sovereign rights and (iii) political rights with economic rights.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
There are two opposing camps when it comes to Sino-African relations. In this chapter, we  
have argued that an approach that will bring the most progress is a “middle passage”: one that 
greases contradictions and offers an accommodative,  balanced, and  pragmatic vision upon 
which Africans can unite. 
There are three main schools of thought in the Sino-African literature, namely: 
optimists, pessimists and   accommodators (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Asongu, 2016ac). 
The first group (or Optimistic school) are China optimists who argue that cooperation with 
China will provide Africa with the opportunity of charting its own development course 
without much Western interference and policy prescription. This group is sympathetic to the 
“Beijing model” of governance, which focuses on state control and national sovereignty. The 
second group (or Pessimistic school) consists of China pessimists who are wary that the Sino-
African relationship is skewed in favour of China. This category instead prefers the 
democracy-oriented approach of the West which pronounces the WC attitude that champions 
political right, underpinned by free market competition. The third group (or Accommodation 
school) consists  of ‘China accommodators’ who combine both the pessimists’ wariness and 
the optimists’ goals. They argue that there is a need for a common development strategy 
toward China that minimizes asymmetries in the relationship as much as possible. The values 
promoted by this group are consistent with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
which emphasizes both African sovereignty/ownership and processes of liberal democracy as 
solid foundations for development. 
 A reason for the non-interference principle is that China, like many African countries, 
has long suspected a Western bias when it comes to the definition and conception of 
‘fundamental human rights’. For instance, with increasing moves by Western countries to 
protect the rights of gays, it is expected that recipients of foreign aid should follow suit. This 
places the demand for such ideals above ‘national/sovereign rights’. To substantiate this 
position, we have discussed a scenario in 2014 in which development assistance was cut to 
Uganda because she passed into law a bill on punishing homosexual activities.  
 Another bias that is apparent is the so called ‘resource diplomacy’ of China by 
Africa’s pro-Western China pessimists. But China’s approach is similar to America’s long-
standing oil-based foreign policy with countries like Saudi Arabia. Moreover the historical 
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involvement of France in Africa has not been guided by her cherished values of “liberty, 
fraternity, and equality.”  
 Within this framework, whereas it is apparent that countries in Africa protect the 
citizens’ individual rights, foreign perspectives of what should constitute a right should not 
take precedence over sovereign authority. In the same vein, space should not be created by 
international law so that some countries punish and criticize other countries on matters that 
should be settled by domestic democracy and law. This dimension entails the selectivity of the 
International Criminal Court in its application of law. An important issue being tackled by the 
NEPAD is precedence between “the right to bread,” or economic rights, which the ‘Beijing 
model’ camp emphasizes, and “the right to vote,” or political rights, which the pro-Western 
supporters put first. Here, the key is sequencing. 
 Based on the fact that a starving person is most likely to give-up his/her vote in 
exchange for basic economic privileges like the rights to bread and shelter, it can be surmised 
that a certain level of economic prosperity is required before genuine political rights can be 
demanded or prioritized.  However entrenched pessimists on Sino-African relations are to free 
market policies, it is difficult to deny that the Beijing model has rapidly created a burgeoning 
middle class by lifting millions of people out of poverty. In the light of this evidence, African 
countries too can focus on a similar orientation of prioritizing economic rights instead of 
overly emphasis on political rights as a precondition for productive structures and economic 
prosperity.  
 While pessimists of Sino-African relations may not be comfortable with the fact that 
the link between China and Africa is growing stronger, China is only leveraging on the 
principles of globalization which these pessimists so much cherish. Hence, China is also 
playing by the same rules espoused by advocates of the Washington Consensus. However, a 
flourishing middle class is needed before a sustainable shift to credible liberal democracy can 
take place.  
 The imperative for a development approach that is two-pronged by incorporating 
elements of both the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Model has been underscored by 
the outcome of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts. Whereas lack of economic opportunities 
substantially fuelled pro-democracy uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and other countries, 
the dream that ‘the right to vote’ would take precedence over ‘the right to bread’ has become 
a nightmare.  
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 In essence, in spite of the overthrow of authoritarian regimes, Egypt so far has been 
unable to build a democratic government that  credibly and effectively enforces the rule of 
law, Libya is considerably worse-off and change in Tunisia remains very unpredictable. 
Maybe if the rights of sovereignty had been considered, with foreign powers acknowledging 
the need for building consensus instead of funding rebellions, political breakthrough could 
have been reached, paving the path towards sustainable economy-boosting policies.  
 From a more contemporary view, it appears that the West has not learnt her lesson 
because of her long-standing demand for the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to stand down 
before any credible peace-building process can be initiated. Whereas Western leaders have 
softened their stances in recent months, the consequences of this have been very damaging 
because President Assad has also  used the position of the West to create an environment 
whereby his enemies have become those of the West as well as many members of the Western 
funded rebellion joining the ranks of the Islamic State and turning against both Assad and the 
West.  
 The above narratives are not to condone policies of repression from authoritarian 
leaders whose regimes have been ousted. The position of this chapter, however, is to 
emphasize the potential rewards of greater stability-related approaches that build on a 
consensus between the Western interest in promoting political rights and national/sovereign 
rights that are espoused by the Beijing model.  
 The growing involvement of China in Africa is crucial not exclusively for direct 
economic rewards, but also for alternative development strategies. We have argued in this 
chapter that African countries can substantially enhance the prospect of development if an 
African consensus builds on a merger between the Western and Chinese models: a balance 
that integrates national interest with human rights, sovereign authority with individual rights 
and economic goals with political rights. 
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